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Perspectives on Organizational and Structural Implications of E-Commerce on Agriculture 
 
  Electronic commerce and associated information technologies have grown to the point 
that they have reached the vaunted status of defining the “new economy.”  The most recent 
driving technology behind electronic commerce is the Internet.   Using computers for 
communication purposes has long been possible, but the two core features that differentiate the 
Internet are distributed computing and its open architecture.  Distributed computing refers to the 
concept of having access to multiple applications through networked computers all capable of 
performing similar tasks.  Historical information exchange systems for electronic data 
interchange (EDI) such as value added networks (VANs) required significant investment in both 
hardware and software coding and were largely proprietary and limited competition (Kekre and 
Mudhopadhyay, 1992).  The Internet provides a common and open architecture where regardless 
of location or time, multiple users with a personal computer and a browser can access 
applications at the same time.   Although the Internet is a communication tool, application 
platform, and database, the digital economy also relies on infrastructure technologies that allow 
for the digitization of the physical world.  For example, bar code scanning technology, radio 
frequency identification (RFI) technology and magnetic strip or embedded chip technologies 
must be in place to convert the physical world to the digital world of the Internet.  The mantra of 
farm management for years has been “if you can measure it, you can manage it.”  The electronic 
measurement technologies open the world of what can be measured and then communicated to 
other users in the supply chain and throughout agricultural markets.   
_______________________________________ 
*W. Parker Wheatley is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Applied Economics at the 
University of Minnesota.  
** Brian Buhr is an Associate Professor in the Department of Applied Economics at the 
University of Minnesota.   
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  This paper relies on the economic and business literatures as well as the experiences of 
the authors with both electronic commerce firms and traditional agribusiness firms to provide a 
road map for economic and policy issues, which will arise from the adoption of electronic 
commerce in agriculture.  Much has been written about e-commerce implications in the broader 
economy, but little attention has been focused on the implications for agriculture.  We argue that 
agriculture has unique characteristics affecting its entrance into the digital world.  Through 
research and experience in industry, we have come full circle from the hyperbole of the “new 
economy” to the quote by Hal Varian: “Technology changes.  Economic laws do not.”  The 
economic and policy implications of the Internet and information technologies on agricultural 
commerce will be driven by four factors: (1) the ability of the Internet and digital measurement 
technologies to allow for product differentiation and identity preservation through the increased 
flow of information on product attributes and related information in the agri-food supply chain, 
(2) the structure and business development of firms providing Internet commerce applications, 
(3) the ability of individual producers and agribusinesses to adopt information technologies and 
use them in ways that improve the capacity for coordination in the areas of production, logistics, 
and marketing, and (4) the regulatory environment that emerges to monitor electronic commerce.  
However, to make inferences, draw conclusions, and suggest research about each of these forces, 
we must first review and present how e-commerce has been and is currently practiced.  
Furthermore, we must investigate more deeply the Internet and related technologies and their 
actual and potential implementation.  Once we have a clear perspective of the objects of interest, 
we can then better discuss and propose research directions relative to the four issues noted above.  
 
Electronic Commerce in Agriculture: Past and Present 
 
Origins and Early Developments of Electronic Commerce 
  Electronic markets in agriculture have existed for at least the past three decades.  
Electronic markets arose in the early 1970’s as some agricultural markets were becoming or had 
become somewhat vertically coordinated or integrated.  In considering electronic markets, the 
concern to be addressed was that a system of decentralized and closed trading would fail to 





(Forker, 1975).  Several private and public supported electronic exchange mechanisms began to 
develop.  In particular, an electronic computerized egg exchange (Egg Clearing House, Inc., 
1972) arose because producers were concerned that without an open market mechanism, there 
was little foundation upon which fair exchange contracts could be formed (Henderson, 1982). 
Similarly, with rising concerns about the effects of cotton contracts between producers and 
buyers on the open market competitive process, TELCOT was established in 1975 to promote 
transparent cotton price discovery.  These systems were developments in electronic marketing 
that promoted open information and access to markets  (Kohls and Uhl, 1990).  Other 
experiments include the Hog Accelerated Marketing Systems (HAMS), the National Electronic 
Marketing Association, and CATTLEX (Henderson, 1984).  Except for TELCOT and the Egg 
Clearinghouse, most of these experiments never achieved a critical volume to sustain them.  
While neither TELCOT nor the Egg Clearinghouse holds a large share of their respective 
markets, both remain as open market checks on the contracting process.  As for the meat 
industry, an area of particular importance given the rapid and increasing dependence of 
contracting in organizing exchange between producers and processors, no significant long-term 
success was found with electronic trading in the early years of these markets. 
In more recent years, however, some European electronic marketing ventures have been 
successful.  In Belgium, an electronic marketing system was able to obtain a 6 percent share of 
the market for slaughter cattle (Viaene, Gellynck, Verbeke, 1998).  In the United Kingdom, 
Electronic Auction Systems, Ltd. (EASE) was the first firm to allow for electronic trading of 
beef and sheep via auctions in the United Kingdom, and it has achieved a certain degree of 
market penetration in the exchange of livestock and grains. (Borman, Karcher, Taylor and 
Williams, 1993).  However, given the relative ease of setting up these auctions, several 
competitors entered the market thereby reducing the liquidity of the EASE markets.  
Furthermore, the existence of several systems imposed additional costs on electronic livestock 
auctioning because each system needed to maintain its own network of agents to perform grading 
of livestock in the field.  Increased costs associated with the existence of parallel systems of 
agents as well as the reduced liquidity have hindered investment in systems and upgrades 






1 have not revolutionized the market of agricultural commodities in there 
respective countries.  
 
The First Years of Internet Agricultural Markets and Technologies 
 
  In tying electronic commerce to economics, a useful paradigm is to consider the Internet 
as a market for information.  The analogy to the competitive market model of economics is 
nearly identical.  The multitude of potential and actual client and server computers are analogous 
to buyers and sellers in the market paradigm.  A client computer is buying or requesting 
information, while a server computer is selling the information (e.g., decision tools, market 
forecasts, and exchange/trading mechanisms).  The market orientation may be even more perfect 
for the Internet because client computers can also be a server and vice versa.  Hence, at any 
given time a computer may be either a buyer or seller of information.  In many cases in the 
physical world, market participants are only either a buyer or seller.  For example, when a farmer 
asks the price of a product via the Internet, there is also the opportunity for him to release 
information as to his production prospect, local weather, etc.  Alternatively, a firm can buy 
content from one provider and repackage it with its own informational goods and services for 
distribution to others.  The second market condition is low barriers to entry.  Digital information 
and computer software have as one of their fundamental attributes as very low marginal costs of 
reproduction.  The first copy of output price data or of a bargaining/auction program may be very 
expensive, however, subsequent copies are virtually free.  Given that computer hardware itself is 
declining in price, the primary barrier to entry revolves around intellectual property issues and 
nearly all costs are variable costs with regard to adoption and use of the Internet and concomitant 
information technologies.  The third condition of a competitive market is that products are 
homogeneous.  The Internet’s primary product is digital data.  At its most fundamental level, this 
is the true definition of a homogeneous product; however, the combination of the binary digital 
data does provide for product differentiation.  That is, the variety of standards and potential for 
network externalities benefiting one or the other standards may impinge on this market aspect in 
the short run.  We will deal with this question and related liquidity concerns later in this paper.  
Nevertheless, the software of the Internet has frequently been able to overcome many 
                                                 
1 These systems are closed in the sense that the marketing infrastructure requires capital investment for trading 





incompatibilities among different platforms.  The fourth and final component of competitive 
markets is costless access to information (e.g., price information).  The fundamental principle of 
distributed computing where virtually all information available on the Internet is easily 
accessible, means that the Internet will foster increasingly cheap and easy access to information.   
Essentially, the Internet’s architecture is such that a competitive market for information 
on physical markets is formed.  Consequently, the evolution of the Internet as a tool for 
commerce is altogether natural.  However, as with physical markets, its efficiency depends on 
implementation.  The current and rapidly evolving e-commerce models represent attempts at an 
early point along the learning curve of such technology.  There have been a number of failures 
and increasing consolidation among agricultural e-commerce firms.  However, the successes and 
persistence of several firms reflects the fact that the technical advancement of the Internet may 
well overcome the historical constraints posed by narrow proprietary exchanges and information 
providers in agriculture.  Before discussing theoretical, research, and policy concerns more 
deeply, we first provide a summary of how we characterize agricultural e-commerce initiatives to 
this point as well as providing examples of each subcategory.  
 
Content Providers  
The earliest form of entrants provided “content.”  Content typically includes news, 
research publications, and simple decision tools (e.g., mortgage calculators).  Land grant 
universities and agricultural journals and newspapers occupy this space in addition to 
commercial businesses and third party e-commerce firms.  The primary difficulty in profiting 
from such business is that news and information has a public goods character about it.  Although 
some sites may have subscription fees for access, they are largely non-excludable and non-rival.  
Non-rivalry has its limits with technology based on bandwidth of the Internet; however, currently 
it is difficult to envision a scenario where demand exceeds the network’s ability to supply access.   
  Sample Content Providers: 
AgWeb.com is a collaboration of Farm Journal (an agricultural media firm), 
Safeguard Scientifics (Internet software, communications, and e-services 
developer and operator), and Madison Dearborn Partners (private equity 
investment firm).  Originally based only on content – information and decision 





for existing input suppliers.  Note, while currently only serving the above 
mentioned areas of the market, they do indicate some interest in providing more 
Agribusiness-to-Grower services (see description below).   
@gricultureonline(www.agriculture.com) - This site is sponsored by Successful 
Farming magazine and  the content provided is very similar to AgWeb.com.  
Rather than a portal for storefronts, it has an agreement with XSAg.com to 
provide input sales services.  
CargillAgHorizons (www.cargill.com/aghorizons) - This example is provided as a 
departure from other content providers in that it is provided by an agribusiness 
firm with the goal of providing consulting information to producers (specifically, 
to producers with which Cargill does business).  Operated mostly as an 
information service, we will consider later how existing firms are utilizing e-
commerce in other ways. 
Miscellaneous Other Sites:  Vantagepoint.com, Agribiz.com, DTN.com, 
AgriMarketing.com, Progressivefarmer.com 
 
Agribusiness-to-Grower Sales (A2G)   
Agribusiness to grower Web sites either sell input supplies to agricultural producers or 
allow producers to sell output to others.  In other markets, these would be classified as business-
to-business (B2B) services.  The distinction is made here because in their current form, growers 
are passive – just as consumers are passive in business-to-consumer commerce (B2C) – so the 
analogy is similar to B2C.  Other than for spot sales, the exchange typically does not offer any 
additional connection between the grower and the seller.  This is a strategically critical point in 
that growers’ passiveness in transactions will likely continue to place them in the “price-taking” 
role of traditional agricultural markets.  A2G sites include third party suppliers (those suppliers, 
which have no direct involvement in manufacturing or distribution of the product) as well as 
physical companies marketing directly (e.g., Cargill or Land O’Lakes).   
The basic value of A2G sites is that they reduce search and matching costs as well as 
lowering other sales transaction costs.  Increasingly, they include back-office applications, which 
manage sales logistics (inventory management, invoicing, shipping orders, and aligning 





information).   All sites also provide content, including news, weather, market reports, and 
possibly decision tools. 
  Sample A2G sites: 
XSAg.com – Focused on input supply sales (animal health, seed, machinery parts, 
crop inputs).  XSAg.com originated on the same model as Priceline.com, 
providing an intermediary role for marketing excess farm inputs by commercial 
agribusiness.  They originally used a reverse-posted price format, just as 
Priceline.com, where the buyer makes an offer (see definitions of market 
definitions below).   As a third party exchange, they now have posted price 
formats and reverse-auctions as well.  They provide value-added services such as 
shipping, billing, bundling and product application information.   
DirectAg.com  - Focuses on input supply sales (animal health, seed, machinery 
parts, crop inputs).  Although a third party, they are different from XSAg.com in 
that they are more of a catalog service for agribusiness companies, offering 
products at posted prices.  The model is very similar to the well-known 
Amazon.com as they attempt to achieve scope in sales as a one-stop shop for 
inputs.  They also provide online financing for input purchases made.   
e-Markets.com – Represents a hybrid version of exchange.  e-Markets.com has 
applications, which allow purchase of seed inputs direct from suppliers, as well as 
an exchange for outputs (grain only).  Unique among third party sites, they almost 
exclusively rely on direct linkages between growers and agribusinesses.  They 
have contracting applications where they act as a facilitator of the contracts and 
orders.  They also offer logistics functions for parties using their exchanges.  e-
Markets is very nearly what one would consider an outsourced e-commerce 
strategy, where in nearly all cases there is a specific agribusiness company 
executing the actual transaction with e-Markets providing the forum to match 
parties.  
Rooster.com – Rooster.com was originally established by a consortium of Cenex 
Harvest States Cooperatives, Cargill, Dupont with ADM joining this group of 
investors later.  It was originally geared toward both input and output sales, 





November 2000, it has broadened its group of strategic investors to further 
support its goal of becoming an open and unbiased Internet market for agriculture 
with the primary goal of providing electronic support for traditional market 
relationships.  Since February 2001, it has further sought to broaden its approach 
by merging Pradium.com (also originating from the same establishing 
consortium) with its business operations.  The Pradium component of the business 
will allow market participants (e.g., commercial grain handling between 
manufacturers, shippers, processors, and elevators) to exchange and interact 
outside of the traditional avenues in an open market place.   
Farms.com – Farms.com began as an independent third party exchange.  
However, it is now a consortium of agriculture information service providers (i.e., 
Data Transmission Network (DTN) and an agricultural marketing and consulting 
firm, Sparks Commodities).  In the parlance of Sawhney (1999), they would be 
considered a ‘metamediary’ with a broad scope of input and output exchanges and 
auctions across nearly all agricultural commodities.  They are heavily focused on 
unique content and decision tools.   
The Seam (www.theseam.com) - is the Internet descendant of TELCOT, the 
electronic exchange discussed earlier in the paper, and was initiated by a 
consortium of cotton merchants (including Hohenberg brothers a division of 
Cargill), cotton cooperatives (including the Plains Cotton Cooperative 
Association, the founder of TELCOT), and textile mills.  As a purportedly neutral 
enterprise, The Seam extends the TELCOT technology and provides exchange 
services to growers and agribusinesses involved in the cotton trade.  
Miscellaneous Other Sites:  Agrimall.com, Farmbid.com, Powerfarm.com, 
eMerge Interactive.com, and CattleSale.com. 
 
Agribusiness-to-Agribusiness Exchanges (A2A) 
A2A exchanges operate at a higher level in the agri-food supply chain typically 
facilitating logistics and exchanges between first handlers (e.g., fluid milk plants) and processors 
and manufacturers (e.g., cheese or ice cream plants).  One major difference is that they are often 





attribute is largely a result of their scale, volume, and high degree of focus (e.g., dairy or meat 
products only).  Hence, the number of total participants is low but the volumes of transactions 
can be huge.  Although including pricing features in some cases, A2A is heavily focused on 
logistics management applications including collaborative planning and forecasting, inventory 
management and transactions management (invoicing, bills-of-lading, shipping, order 
management, etc.).  An analogy in non-agricultural industries is Covisint, a collaborative 
procurement and supply chain tool launched by General Motors, Ford Motors and 
DaimlerChrysler.   
  Sample A2A sites: 
ProvisionX.com  - ProvisionX.com is touted as a neutral exchange (in nearly all 
cases, the exchange itself is a separate corporate entity).  It was formed by a 
consortium of IBP, Smithfield Foods, Excel Corporation, Tyson Foods, Farmland 
Cooperative, and GoldKist, companies that represent the major meat and poultry 
slaughter and processing companies in the United States.  Its exchange was 
launched on March 29, 2001 and is primarily oriented toward order management 
and sales.  
Dairy.com  - Dairy.com, founded as a consortium of dairy cooperatives, cheese 
processors, and manufacturers, is also touted as a neutral exchange.  Initial 
members of the founding consortium included Land O’Lakes, Dairy Farmers of 
America Cooperative, and Kraft Foods, although it now includes over 38 firms as 
trading companies.   Its exchange is primarily a posted bid-ask bartering format 
with sellers posting asking prices and buyers posting bids (offers).  Negotiation is 
primarily one-on-one.  Although they are working on a collaborative supply 
management application, it is not apparent what logistic or services solutions are 
offered, or, which might be included. 
Vtraction.com – Vtraction.com provides one of the more interesting e-commerce 
initiatives in that it is a “cooperative” of several Web sites including Farms.com, 
Tradingproduce.com, Foodtrader.com, WineryExchange.com, Agrositio.com, 
with Rabobank (the largest agricultural and food credit provider in the world) as 
the organizing partner.  Several of these “cousins” share a common exchange 





commercial firms and handles back-office logistics as well as exchange functions.  
There are no transaction fees in any of the exchanges, but revenues are generated 
by ancillary service activities such as credit provision.  
Miscellaneous Other Sites: IceCorp.com and Agmotion.com.  
 
Commodity Futures and Derivatives Markets  
To this point, all previous examples have involved the buying and selling of actual 
physical commodities.  However, e-commerce is being adapted to traditional futures commodity 
exchanges as well.  The major advantage as far as adaptation is that these exchanges are virtual 
in the sense there are no direct logistics issues (other than trade clearing functions) to deal with.  
However, regulatory concerns as well as institutional foot dragging have slowed their 
development.  Unlike securities trading, commodities trading is highly risky involving both 
margin accounts and the ability to short sell.   Historically, commodities trading is highly 
regulated and strictly the domain of licensed traders and brokers.  Therefore, online commodities 
trading has been subject to a great deal of scrutiny prior to its approval.  Secondly, and equally as 
important, institutions and traders have been opponents – especially floor traders who have 
significant equity and value in their “seat” on the floor of the exchange.  Current Chicago Board 
of Trade Full Memberships (seats) are trading at about $328,000.  Opening access to exchanges 
through electronic commerce has been perceived as lowering the value of the seats and therefore 
is a concern to traders.  In addition, many traders consider face-to-face interaction an important 
aspect of effectively trading in an open outcry format.  Although these issues have slowed the 
adaptation of electronic commerce to commodity exchanges, all major U.S. agricultural 
commodities exchanges currently either are trading electronically or have electronic trading 
capabilities. 
  Sample Futures Sites: 
eCBOT – Electronic CBOT trading essentially mimics the open outcry trading 
environment with a paperless system.  It allows member firms to place orders 
electronically to their floor traders, eliminating runners and the need for printing 
paper orders.  The floor trader essentially uses an electronic order entry device to 
confirm the order placement in the electronic management system.  Back-office 





matching errors.  Essentially, this system maintains all the institutional structure 
of traditional commodity trading but eliminates the high volume of paperwork 
involved.  A second avenue is the electronic trading platform alliance/cbot/eurex 
trading alliance, which operates as a dedicated network and allows electronic 
trading of derivatives.  This trading initiative among CBOT and Eurex is directed 
to institutional traders. 
Globex2 –  This electronic trading environment was initiated by the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) and is proprietary to members of the CME.  The 
primary products traded are currency, financial and equity index futures.  
However, they do include a mini-contract in lean hogs and in feeder cattle as well 
as standard contracts on stocker cattle, fresh pork bellies, and pork cutouts.  It 
allows for full electronic trading and provides clearing and matching functions for 
orders.   
Enrononline – Enron online is perhaps the most sophisticated electronic 
derivative and commodity trading platform.  Enron trades primarily in energy, 
pulp, paper, weather derivatives and other “off-exchange” commodities.  Their e-
commerce platform allows for pricing, order execution, and logistics.  Enron 
creates its products and derivatives itself and hedges on the existing commodities 
exchanges, but exchanges the derivative products with their clients.   
 
While not comprehensive with regard to all agricultural e-commerce initiatives, this 
overview should provide a general idea of the scope of current activities in agricultural e-
commerce.  Importantly, this overview ignores the agri-food system downstream from 
processors, including distribution, wholesale, and retail operations.  Such issues are beyond the 
scope of this report, but it is important to note that this ‘beyond processor’ section of the agri-
food supply chain will play an increasing role in the direction of agricultural production and 
manufacturing.  In fact, one might argue that these downstream components of the supply chain 
may be nexus of a larger amount of supply chain information given its closer proximity and 






The Technological Architecture and Business Development of Agricultural E-Commerce 
 
The history of open electronic markets in agriculture, while relatively long, has not 
provided significant hope for those who might believe such markets are a panacea for producers 
and buyers alike.  Like any market mechanism, the test of their relevance and usefulness 
ultimately will be reflected in the choices of market participants and will depend on the choices 
of firms and associations of firms in structuring and organizing agricultural exchanges and 
markets for the Internet.   
 
The Unique Side of Agricultural E-Commerce: The Physical Side 
One of the distinct challenges for agriculture e-commerce initiatives is the non-
uniformity of products that are being transacted.  Difficulties associated with this non-uniformity 
are reflected in the fact most of the successes in agricultural e-commerce have been in packaged 
products such as fertilizer, farm chemicals, animal health products and machinery parts, or in 
commodity markets, which are fungible.  The adaptation of electronic commerce systems to 
more heterogeneous or quality differentiated agricultural outputs remains as a difficult 
impediment to implementation and yet potentially an area of significant opportunity.  In the 
simplest context, we know that livestock have differing quality traits that affect their end-use just 
as a function of their growth and meat/fat characteristics.  Similarly, different varieties of wheat 
have different milling qualities.  These attributes can easily be handled by grading standards 
since many of these traits are observable; however, what can be done about non-observable 
traits?  This is increasingly an issue with GMO’s in crops and differing production practices 
(e.g., antibiotic free or hormone free) in livestock. The recent Starlink corn debacle provides an 
apt example of the need to somehow link digital and physical information.  There are firms 
engaged in physical identity preservation, including Aginfolink and Destron Fearing to name 
two; however, while technology is evolving, this monitoring process will not be as simple as 
labeling a commodity, it will require verification. Tests can be used but they are expensive.   
  Importantly, the origins of infrastructure in tracking products lies in the retail food 
industry.  For several years, grocers have implemented frequent shopper programs, wherein 
customers fill out a form and receive a scanner read card that records limited demographic data 





consumer interface.  Firms such as Webvan.com
2 and SimonDelivers.com are attempting to 
develop distribution centers and eliminate the physical structure of the retail store to home 
deliver groceries.  Each of their business models includes the ability, by definition, to 
electronically track consumer purchases and, therefore, potentially create continual 
replenishment direct to the consumer.  This enables virtual integration of consumer preferences 
and purchasing patterns into the supply chain.  To this point the information has primarily been 
used for point of purchase merchandising, such as category management schemes and featuring 
of products.  This limited use is primarily due to the limited transmission of data beyond retail to 
manufacturing, processing and production.  As electronic commerce enhances the efficiency of 
transmitting information beyond firm boundaries, individual producers may be able to gain 
access to information previously available only to those capable of conducting extensive market 
research programs.  This will further aid producers in differentiating their product and enhance 
the value they obtain from the marketing system in addition to increasing incentives to invest in 
identity preservation technologies. 
Importantly, electronic traceability is fundamentally necessary to allow individual 
producers to gain benefits from electronic commerce.  Traceability is defined as the ability to 
identify and verify attributes of products whether observable or unobservable to the end-user.   If 
a product can be clearly traced from producer to processor and processor to consumer, there is an 
increased capacity by market participants to differentiate their products at both stages in the 
producer to processor relationship.  For example, if a processor can more easily identify and 
verify that a particular product is organic coming from the farm level, they have an increased 
incentive to enter such markets as well as make efforts to differentiate their final products.  This 
leads to an important question for e-commerce in agriculture.  Can the Internet, along with 
digital information technologies, allow for increased production differentiation, while at the 
same time, improve access to markets by a diverse set of participants?  
 
                                                 





Logistics, Supply Chain Management and E-Commerce 
 
Early Efforts at Supply Chain Management via Electronic Media 
  Electronic logistics applications are not new, and originated with Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) between firms.  EDI primarily serves as a direct conduit for firm-to-firm 
communications of purchase orders, invoices, and other communications.  The primary 
difference compared to Internet logistics applications is that EDI systems were firm specific and 
offered little connectivity without significant hardware and software investments.  Because of 
their “direct lines,” they offer higher security than the Internet; however, the main advantages to 
EDI are that it improves speed of communication, reduces errors because of limited intervention 
once an order is placed, and reduces direct paper costs.  Still, the costs of investment in EDI and 
its peripheral nature to the business reduced its adoption.   
  There are three major technological changes, which have occurred since the original 
development of EDI on mainframe based systems.  First, the mainframe moved to the desktop in 
the form of PC’s, therefore, the costs and accessibility to EDI improved.  Second, internal 
production processes were automated.  The automation process created a production data stream, 
which introduces another important link in the chain of internal firm communication of 
information to external communication.  In this context, bar code technology was developed over 
25 years ago by the Uniform Codes Council; and, associated holographic scanners allow for the 
reading of barcodes to capture data regarding product name, weights, sales value, etc.  An 
example in the grocery industry is the implementation of bar code scanners at checkout, and 
automated robotic “pickers” at distribution warehouses.  Now, sales information can be quickly 
transferred via EDI so that appropriate items are picked and packaged for store delivery without 
need for manual processing of a purchase order or having to control stocks.  Predicated on an 
information partnership, this approach has replaced purchase orders with production schedules 
and inventory balances.  Rather than have purchasing agents review raw material requirements 
and place purchase orders, purchase orders can be placed automatically based on pre-determined 
inventory levels.  Third, the Internet introduces a critical technology improvement over EDI.  
That is, the Internet contributes an open architecture and enables a more cost effective 
networking of any number of suppliers.  Several challenges still remain: developing a common 





further improving available tools (e.g., bar codes) to electronically track raw physical 
agricultural commodities.   
 
Supply Chain Management Standardization Issues  
There are basically two aspects to standards in traditional EDI. The first aspect is simply 
the implementation of compatible computer hardware and software systems.  Left to their own 
devices, firms could develop any number of hardware and business software architectures, which 
have no guarantee of compatibility.  Obviously, with high costs of development to start with, this 
problem hindered EDI adoption.  The second issue is more mundane, there also needs to be a 
standard for the information that is to be communicated.  Two firms may have two entirely 
different purchase order formats.  If they do not match, it is impossible to convey the data 
between the two appropriately.  In the past, trade groups were formed to address standards 
development to overcome these issues.  All major American EDI transaction groups are now 
covered under the general umbrella of the Accredited Standards Committee (ASC),  and are 
referred to as the X12 group of standards. With increasing globalization, the United Nations has 
provided a forum and developed UN/EDIFACT (United Nations Electronic Data Interchange for 
Administration, Commerce and Transport).  
With regard to the related bar code technology, which allows for rapid data entry, 
UCCNet is an effort by the Uniform Codes Council to develop Web-based standards for data 
entry, and transmission for Web-based electronic data interchange.  Such technology, once 
standardized may provide a foundation for identity preservation and raw material tracking.  
UCCNet also jointly works with the Voluntary Inter-industry Commerce Standards Association 
(VICS) as well as ebXML.org, which is the committee responsible for development of electronic 
business XML standards.  Such standardization of protocols will aid and augment adoption of 
standardization and information technology. 
Even with standards, infrastructure costs significantly reduce the accessibility of EDI to 
small businesses.  The Internet and related technologies may change that.  First, rather than each 
company maintaining a separate infrastructure for supporting EDI, the computing infrastructure 
is shared via servers in a network.  Similarly, the applications provided begin to naturally have 
synergies as businesses begin to share the development.  The major challenge of commonality of 





language (XML) is being developed and promises to provide a common platform.  A simple 
comparison of HTML and XML illustrates how they differ.  To display information through a 
Web browser on an order of 50 gallons of Atrazine (a herbicide) purchased from a dealer in 
Jefferson, Iowa would look like what we show below.  The output is purely a text file and if this 
is to be entered into a database, it must be converted into appropriate fields or tables by 
additional code.  Any asynchronous text will result in database errors. 
<p> Atrazine 
<br> Jefferson, Iowa 
<br> 50 gallons 
Now, XML would show the same information as follows: 
</product> Atrazine 
<dealer> Jefferson, Iowa 
<quantity> 50 gallons 
In this case, XML not only provides the data (Atrazine, Jefferson, Iowa, 50 gallons) it tells the 
reader what it is; therefore, there is no need to go back and query a database, and similarly, the 
<product> tag tells any application that this is a product so it only requires standardization of the 
tags and not the overall format of the information required of a text file.   
  The ability to communicate seamlessly across firms and to monitor within firm processes 
as indicated earlier, leads to the concept of collaborative planning, forecasting and 
replenishment.  The idea is that once a supplier and a buyer can communicate their status, it 
becomes possible for them to jointly plan production activities such as inventory, shipping and 
delivery.  For example, if I am a retailer selling packaged meat products, my sales and inventory 
data is shared with my vendors which in turn schedule deliveries based on this information.  
However, to accomplish this task, base levels of inventories must be established, ordering and 
delivery timing must be determined, and intervention strategies must be developed.  All of this 
requires a high level of collaboration between entities.  Another relevant technology, which is 
only just being developed to exploit the information of the Internet, is notion of intelligent 
agents.  Intelligent agents are software, which can be programmed to interact in markets and 
bargain with human agents working at a terminal or other intelligent agents.  This development 
will help to overcome what has been called the limits of human attention in gathering 





communications, and logistics innovations is that they greatly improve the efficiency of 
standardizing all types of databases and paper material and should enable lower cost 
implementation of inter-firm logistics.  They also should become much more accessible to 
smaller businesses. 
  The primary driver of communications and logistic efforts are retailers, distributors and 
manufacturers; therefore, much of the work to date leaves the production agriculture supply 
chain beyond the first handler or processor outside these activities.  The primary problem is that 
agricultural bulk commodities (such as meat, milk, etc.) are largely fungible and often blended at 
processing, or in the case of meats disassembled to complete a final consumer product.  
Traditionally, there was not a perceived need to trace food throughout the supply chain.  As 
mentioned, increased concerns about production protocols (hormones, antibiotics, organic, etc.) 
and the arrival of GMOs, has given impetus for maintaining product identity back to the original 
producer.  The above technological improvements in data management may be implemented in 
the A2G sector of the market as well; however, the exchange mechanism used to coordinate such 
transfer is still being debated.  While many firms are attempting to maintain product identity via 
vertical integration and coordination, the Internet may in fact allow more open procurement and 
logistics operations.   
 
Agribusiness Web Site Development Issues: Virtual Market Creation 
  The technical architecture of the Internet and e-commerce platforms will be left to 
information technology specialists, however, it is important to understand the business or 
economic architecture of the Internet.  Earlier in this paper, the analogy of markets and Internet 
structure was developed.  Here the focus is more on the structure of the sites.  In general, Web-
based e-commerce sites consist of: (1) a database, (2) a search and match algorithm, (3) an 
exchange mechanism or market model, and (4) security.  While there are a number of ways to 
implement each of these components, depending on hardware platforms, software, and coding 
expertise, these are the building blocks of any exchange. 
 
Databases – The Heart of E-Commerce 
  In all markets, there is a need to identify the buyer, seller and products to be sold.   





allow for capturing this information in a digital format and then enable the other resulting 
applications such as searching, matching and exchanges.  The advent of the concept of relational 
databases in the late 1960’s allowed for arranging unordered tables through operations to create a 
highly flexible set of operations to generate new tables of information.  The contribution of the 
Internet as mentioned earlier is that the databases can be maintained on a central host server and 
queried by any number of clients.  This allows for entry and extraction of data from the database 
by multiple users anywhere.  The analogy to markets is that the database now is the centrum or 
market center around which commerce evolves.  People bring their “digital” goods into the 
database, allowing sellers and buyers to identify the product and the value.  All other constructs 
of e-commerce revolve around making the market (or database) function more efficient in 
clearing the market.  Figure 1 provides a screenshot of XSAg.com’s auction site illustrating an 
order form.  In order to “make the market” for 2,4-D (an herbicide), the quantity of the product 
must be defined, it’s dates for offer must be defined, delivery information is needed, and the 
seller’s identity must be added.  All this information is captured in the database so that interested 
buyers can query the database to see what offerings might be there.  This is a relatively simple 
example, but one can imagine the complexity if one were to think about the database required for 
grain sales.  There are an extremely large set of potential buyer and seller locations, an extremely 
large spectrum of quality or attribute specifications, and of course a very large number of 
potential market participants.  An effective e-commerce strategy must first develop a database 
architecture, which can manage this complex array of market information.  
Databases themselves provide little value.  They provide data, not information.  To bring 
databases to life requires development of querying routines.  Also, they must be accessible to 
users.  In the case of XSAg.com, it is relatively easy for a user to input the six or seven key 
pieces of information directly through the web interface.  However, imagine the complexity of a 
market for a grocery store.  No individual could possibly key in the estimated 10,000 unique 
product codes necessary to utilize an online ordering application.  However, because of the open 
architecture of the Internet it is possible to have my database communicate with your database to 
seamlessly populate the market database.  The current challenge is to find software solutions to 





language (XML) seems to be the frontrunner. 
 
Figure 1.  Data Input for XSAg.com 
 
Search and Match Algorithms 
In traditional marketplaces, people and products are physically present and it is 
incumbent on them to find the best buyer or seller.  This process can have very high search costs.   
However, in an Internet environment, once the database is established, the foundation for the 
market or exchange exists where search and match algorithms allow the database to be queried in 
an open architecture and potential trading partners can be easily located.  In simple settings 
where there is a single attribute of preference, this process is quite easy; however, as additional 
objects of preference are added (e.g., product type and delivery date), these computer-based 
algorithms allow for such multi-attribute search and match processes more efficiently than 
physical analogs.  Just as with physical markets, the objective is to minimize search costs of two 
market participants with mutual objectives of finding one another and completing an economic 





procurement through the market.  As an extension of the search and match problem, such 
mechanisms allow for aggregation and/or disaggregation of orders.  That is, more than one seller 
can contribute to a given buyers order and vice versa.  This arrangement opens the market to a 
broader set of potential buyers and sellers. 
 
The Exchange or Market Mechanism 
Now we have an infrastructure for trading (database) and a mechanism to identify 
potential buyers and sellers (matching and searching).  The question is how do we establish price 
at which to settle the transaction?  Exchange mechanisms themselves consist of two components: 
(1) the price discovery mechanism and (2) the rules governing the use of the market mechanism.  
The rules dictate how the price mechanism will be organized.  It will typically set times of sale 
(origination of bids or offers and closing of bids and offers) in the case of auctions, requirements 
of participants (e.g., bonding, licensing, earnest money, or reputational verification), location 
(although in Internet terms this becomes irrelevant unless certain regions are excluded for 
purposes of limiting subsequent shipping), settlement conditions (cash at sale, cash at delivery, 
credit requirements, down payments, etc.), dispute resolution (either mediation or civil legal 
penalties), warranties or guarantees (e.g., what to do if goods are damaged in transit) and other 
aspects.  Following is a brief taxonomy of market mechanisms, followed by a discussion of the 
relevant economic and structural issues related to their use. 
Posted Prices  
Posted price mechanisms are simply the case where either the buyer or seller 
offers a take-it-or-leave it price.  They are often referred to as static price mechanisms, 
but in the long run, posted prices are dynamic as well.  If supply falls for a given product 
in response to excessively low posted offers per unit, the buying party will increase the 
posted price.  In the very short-term (say in the next hour or day) posted prices will be 
static; however, over the period of a month, even posted prices can be quite dynamic.  
The primary advantage to posted prices is their very high bargaining efficiency.
3  
However, pricing efficiency may be low given that the “true” willingness-to-pay by the 
marginal buyer and the “true” willingness to accept by the marginal seller may not be 
                                                 
3 We define bargaining efficiency as a relative measure of the costs of arriving at an agreement of price for a specific 





found.  This is particularly valid where sellers may have different output supply functions 
(marginal cost functions) and some may be willing to accept less per unit of product than 
a buyer is posting as the price.  Hence, in this case, the buyer loses the surplus those 
lower cost suppliers might be willing to accept.  This bargaining versus price efficiency 
tradeoff will be a common thread of comparing market mechanisms.  To improve the 
dynamics of posted prices, some exchanges use automated posted price adjustments.  For 
example, a buyer (seller) may originally set the price at a relatively low (high) level, then 
based on a growth (decay) function algorithm the price is increased (decreased) until 
someone takes the price.  These functions may be simply time oriented, or more complex 
processes.  In one agricultural case, the price is lowered by the marginal cost of storage 
and production as a function of time.  Such mechanisms reduce the monitoring costs of 
posted prices and automate the price discovery process. 
Bargaining or Negotiated Price Discovery 
Bargaining simply enables two or more parties to negotiate direct settlement 
prices.  The seller or buyer may make the original price offer, then the opposite party 
counter-offers and this process continues until they reach an agreed upon price.  While 
electronic markets reduce the search and match costs of bargaining, they do not eliminate 
the inherent communication costs of back and forth bargaining.  Bargaining mechanisms 
in general will have greater price efficiency, but lower bargaining efficiency relative to 
posted prices.  Bargaining has the added dimension that it can introduce strategic 
negotiation and multiple attributes over which participants can bargain.  For example, the 
two parties can negotiate alternative delivery times or locations at different prices, in 
addition to other aspects of the trade such as lot size.  Allowing for such bargaining over 
attributes may well improve the welfare of agents; however, it is at the cost of higher 
bargaining costs and lower efficiency in that sense.  Figure 2 shows an example of a 






Figure 2.  Dairy.com Bid-Ask Management Screen 
 
Auctions 
  Auction mechanisms are the preferred mechanism when pricing and allocative 
efficiency is the primary objective.  This brief review only scratches the surface of 
potential auction mechanisms, by describing only the most predominate forms.  As 
electronic markets innovate and grow, new variations will be used.  As a rule, potential 
users must perceive a given auction mechanism as “fair” or it may not succeed.  There 
are three basic types of open auction mechanisms Dutch auctions, English auctions, and 
double auctions. From these three types, a larger subset of auctions can be derived. 
  Dutch Auctions – Dutch auctions are named for auctions that originated in the 
floral markets in Holland.  The original asking price is set high and the price then lowers 
in defined increments until a buyer “hits” at a price level.  Two major considerations with 
Dutch auctions are that they tend to favor the sellers side in fair markets, in other words, 
the price established tends to be higher than the “true” market price and second, they are 
not naturally collusive for buyers.  A collusive ring would attempt to set the price at the 





valuations of winning the auction items, the buyer with the highest valuation would have 
an incentive to place a bid before the price reached the sellers’ collective reservation 
price.  Thus, the ring would be broken without a need to enforce anti-collusion measures. 
  English Auctions – English auctions begin with a low price and the price increases 
until the item is sold.  English auctions tend to favor buyers all else equal, but they are 
naturally collusive.  With prices increasing, everyone in the cartel has a mutual incentive 
to stop bidding at the pre-defined target price.  Additional bidding by any individual will 
reduce their own welfare and all will stay with the agreed on price fix.  Therefore, 
English auctions must be carefully monitored to ensure that bidding rings do not develop.  
Figure 3 shows an example of an English auction interface at Farms.com. 
 
 






  Double Auctions – In double auctions, both the buyers and sellers make 
instantaneous bid-ask offers.  Double auctions are most familiar in commodity futures 
exchanges.  The exchange provides the function of the auctioneer and rules surrounding 
the auction, but buyers and sellers establish prices simultaneously.  Double auctions work 
well for highly homogeneous markets where all product definitions are predefined, so the 
only product attribute to be discovered is the price.  In these cases, double auctions are 
highly efficient in terms of pricing and bargaining.  When products are heterogeneous, 
double auctions could be illiquid and inefficient in arriving at prices for products. 
  Reverse-Auctions – Direct auctions are as described above in that the seller 
originates the sale by offering a quantity whether in a Dutch or English format.  In 
reverse auctions, the buyer originates the bidding by asking for bids to supply a certain 
good, then suppliers compete to offer the lowest price possible.  In the United States, this 
format is very familiar in government contract bidding.   
  Interestingly, when comparing use of auctions, bargaining, and posted-price 
mechanisms, agriculture tends to favor a form of posted price mechanism where the 
buyer (meat packer or grain elevator) originates the price for a given quantity.  Notably, 
this pricing takes on a dynamic quality as it can change from day to day. 
  Several other types of mechanisms are used.  These include first-price and 
second-price sealed bid auctions as well as combinatorial auctions. 
  Sealed Bid Auctions – Sealed bid auctions are generally conducted either as first-
price or second-price auctions.  Sealed bids mean that participants know only their own 
bids and not the bids of other participants.  Sealed bids eliminate strategic behavior and 
learning during the auction process.  However, sealed bids can be subject to collusion by 
bidders outside the time of bid submission, and hence there must be strict enforcement.  
Because of the lack of learning in a static sense, sealed bid auctions may be structured as 
repetitive auction markets where sealed bids during one auction period are posted prior to 
a subsequent second bid period.  Therefore, participants can learn from other’s behavior 
and adjust their bids accordingly.  First-price auctions give the good(s) to the highest 
bidder in the case of a direct auction or the lowest offer in the case of a reverse auction 
and the winner must pay(charge) the highest(lowest) bid(offer).  Second-price auctions 





the case of a reverse auction and the winner must pay(charge) the second highest(lowest) 
bid(offer).  Under restrictive assumptions, a first-price sealed bid auction will likely elicit 
the same outcome as a Dutch auction; while, a second-price sealed bid auction will yield 
the same outcome as an English auction.  It is unlikely that such auctions would be used 
in agriculture, but we include them to complete the portfolio of options available. 
  Combinatorial Auction Markets – Traditionally, we think of auction markets as 
defined by the product being auctioned.  For example, buying a single rare book on eBay.  
However, auctions are being extended to products whereby assets or rights related to the 
primary good are also included in the auction because they complement or substitute for 
the item being offered.  The proposal for using combinatorial auctions appears 
prominently among proposals to sell communications bandwidth in the United States, 
where it is believed that there is a great deal of complementarity of different bandwidths 
thereby making preferences by firms for certain combinations of bandwidths super-
additive.  Given this attribute of preferences for bandwidths, it was believed that higher 
revenues could be obtained by allowing for combined-value bids, (i.e., a bid for a bundle 
of bandwidths as opposed to a single bandwidth).  While not currently used in 
agriculture, the spatial and temporal nature of agriculture may support the notion of non-
additive preferences for goods and services for agriculture.  An example in agriculture is 
to combine transportation with grain marketing.  In this case, not only is the grain price 
determined, but also the value of transportation of grain to the buyer or seller.  That is, a 
producer is not only concerned with the transfer price of a bushel of corn, but is 
simultaneously concerned about the costs associated with transporting the product to a 
processing or storage facility.  By bundling rights and assets in a single transaction, the 
costs of aggregation and of administering ancillary services such as transportation could 
be lowered by reducing the number of markets a given participant must enter to complete 
an entire production transaction.  Unfortunately, the theoretical pricing efficiency issues 
of combinatorial auctions are not as clear and implementation could be complicated.   
Contracting 
  One could classify contracting as an extension of bargaining with a more long-
term perspective.  In addition, contracts allow parties to arrange for a larger set of issues 





complementary services without need for face-to-face discussions.  As opposed to posted 
prices, bargaining, and auctions, contracting tends to be for longer-term planning and 
coordination among firms.  Given the large amount of recent work on contracting in 
agriculture, we will not go into depth into the various types; however, suffice it to say, 
that the Internet simply would serve as a mechanism to reduce search costs, monitoring 
costs, and administrative costs of contracting.  We discuss the strengths and weaknesses 
of this mechanism relative to other options later in this paper. 
 
Security 
  The last component of an exchange mechanism is its security architecture.  This has three 
dimensions.  First, being the security of the computer system itself to prevent hackers from 
entering and either destroying or copying data.  Second, the system must enable users to have 
access only to information for which they have permission to see.  That is, the intermediary may 
collect private information from users to expedite negotiations; however, no party would want all 
of this revealed to their counterparts in any of the mechanisms discussed above.  Third, it 
includes enforcement of trading rules, which is likely external to the Web site itself.  Security, as 
with any market, creates the environment under which trade occurs and failure to effectively 
develop security systems will destroy a market regardless of how compelling an exchange 
mechanism is. 
 
Business Development of The Internet 
  Before investigating in greater depth how the institutions and applications of electronic 
commerce will impact firm behavior and market structure in agriculture, we will first give a 
greater treatment as to how such institutions have emerged.  Original agricultural e-commerce 
firms were innovative start-up firms with little connection to traditional bricks and mortar 
businesses.  These A2G and A2A firms sought to obtain rents from organizing exchange 
mechanisms and information services in an open format.  This competition was clearly seen by 
bricks and mortar firms concerned about how it might affect their procurement strategies and 
market positions.  As expected, bricks and mortar firms soon found their own Internet commerce 
strategies and launched their own or affiliated Internet businesses (bricks and clicks).  Bricks and 





utilize the Internet as one component of their marketing strategies (Gulati and Garino, 2000).  
While there are Internet “pure-plays” in business-to-business commerce (e.g., Chemdex, 
Plasticsnet, E-steel), B2B commerce has been quickly adopted by traditional bricks and mortar 
firms.  General Motors, Chrysler and Toyota have formed Internet-based supply chain 
mechanisms.  In agriculture, as noted earlier, several firms formed alliances to create 
Rooster.com and Pradium.com; while IBP, Excel, GoldKist, Tyson Foods, Smithfield Foods and 
Farmland Industries announced a joint venture to develop an electronic trading platform for meat 
products ProvisionX.com.  The challenge for firms purely operating on the Internet is to generate 
revenues without increasing transactions costs by charging commissions or subscription fees.  
Bricks and clicks firms have a natural market advantage since the Internet simply represents one 
additional procurement mechanism among their existing manufacturing or distribution chains.   
  While e-commerce ventures by bricks and mortar firms may also translate into cost 
savings by disintermediating brokers and other sale and procurement positions, the impacts of 
ownership of these ventures for individual producers is not clear.  It is likely that individual 
producers would be better off with independent third party market makers, but given the 
alignment of the existing supply chain, these mechanisms will face stiff competition from bricks 
and clicks. 
 
The Interface of Internet Technology with Market Design, Firm Organization,  
and Industry Structure 
  
Technology Adoption and Control – The Real Digital Divide  
  Will individual producers have full access to e-commerce technology? The technology 
can be broken into two components: the hardware/software aspect itself and the strategic and 
tactical use of the technology.  Generally, digital technology has a cost structure characterized by 
high sunk costs for development but very low variable costs associated with replication and 
dissemination.  Once an application or electronic agent has been created, the costs of replicating 
the application or adding a user is practically zero, particularly in the case of Internet commerce, 
where there is no need to provide a medium such as compact discs or floppy discs to distribute 
the program to users.  There is, however, a barrier to individual producer use of the technology 
and applications in that individual producers may find it difficult to generate their own electronic 





development of commerce applications, as these will be developed either by their commercial 
trading partners or third party market intermediaries.  Who develops commerce applications as 
well as who owns them will have important strategic implications for how individual producers 
engage in electronic commerce and who benefits.  A party engaged in the transaction may have 
an incentive to develop applications that suit their strategic market positions at the expense of 
other parties in the transactions.  While economic theory suggests that such a strategy would fail, 
as few other market participants would use such a mechanism given any overt bias, it is 
nevertheless possible to introduce small factors into a mechanism without signaling any gross 
bias.  Third party electronic commerce providers argue that they can develop unbiased exchanges 
or market algorithms while not facing a direct conflict of interest (Kaplan and Sawhney, 2000).   
Unfortunately, as noted earlier, these third party mechanisms operate on very small margins in 
the face of stiff competition.  The digital divide often spoken of, as access to technology will not 
likely persist, however, as we alluded to earlier, the digital divide in strategic control of 
applications and implementation is still possible. 
 
Information Economizing, Mechanism Choice, and Firm Organization 
  In the previous sections, we have reviewed the history of electronic commerce in 
agriculture, the technological advances in logistics and supply chain management in the food and 
agriculture system, and the architecture of exchanging products and services with the Internet as 
the communications technology.  We now provide an overview of how we see the 
implementation of such technologies via the Internet in the organization of exchange 
mechanisms, firms, and industries.  Before addressing these concerns, we first list the areas in 
which information technology and the Internet reduce costs and change the nature of the 
relationships among firms.  The impacts of the Internet will be noticeable as they move us farther 
down the road of technical efficiency in communicating and processing information within and 
between firms (as telephones, facsimile, and EDI have before). 
  The salient information management economizing features of Internet technology are the 
following.   
1.  The Internet as a communication technology is able to significantly reduce the costs 
associated with the paper work of organizing trade.  No longer must a paper trail be kept by 





services or facsimile machines.  The Internet allows participants to send and maintain files of 
contracts and trading data in a digital format as well as provide easy access to such 
information to authorized individuals and firms.   
2.  Through its open architecture and possibly intelligent software agents, the costs of looking 
for and gathering information on possible trading partners, is reduced.  That is, rather than 
relying on a series of telephone calls to different regions as to the availability of particular 
products or services, individuals and firms can seek out such information without leaving 
their office and with fewer messages being used to get such information as opposed to 
multiple telephone calls, faxes, etc.   
3.  The need to find suppliers or buyers of proper size is reduced.  That is, software reduces the 
need for individuals who aggregate orders and offers in a given market.  The technology 
allows for software that can provide such aggregation services with relatively open access.   
4.  In terms of bilateral relationships between producers and processors, video data and other 
electronic measurement/monitoring devices, when coupled with the electronic media of the 
Internet, will reduce the costs of a monitoring.  Monitoring costs would include site 
inspection and audits of record keeping.  Similarly, if records are kept electronically, 
producers directly enter data, which is transmitted to their processing counterpart.  That is, if 
a particular processor is interested in monitoring the production processes of the given 
supplier, such mechanisms more easily assure that production practices adhere to the 
processor’s needs.  Increasing such information flows reduces the pervasive problem of 
moral hazard often seen in contractual relationships. 
5.  There is a lowered informational cost of tracing the flow of products through the production 
system, i.e., from producer to processor.  For example, each producer has an identification 
number that is attached to a given shipment of product and, therefore, when shipments are 
received at a processing or storing facility, the manager can use the code as a basis for 
product tracking and identity preservation.  While such tracking does not completely solve 
the issues because of other technological constraints (e.g., we cannot bar code meat, corn, 
etc. and it does not reduce operational separation costs), it does assist in processing 
information and thereby allow for more precise pricing and qualification of products. 
6.  One could also raise the question as to whether the informational capacities of the Internet 





because the Internet opens the flow of data on product availability, location, and logistics, 
farmers and processors can coordinate activities without as much need to use intermediary 
storage and holding facilities. 
 
  One consequence of the above informational cost reducing factors of the Internet is that 
the information about location, type, and quantities of goods produced no longer needs to be 
concentrated with an individual or firm, but is available in digital form through the Internet and 
related software thereby more efficiently managing information and reducing the potential for 
human errors in such management.  Also, such informational decentralization (i.e., potentially 
removing market data from individual and propriety venues to a public digital arena) opens the 
trading process to a more diverse set of market participants as well as a more heterogeneous set 
of products and services. All of the above issues highlight the fact that the cost of processing 
information and monitoring activity between firms is reduced.  Similar issues are overcome in 
vertically integrated firms.  Aside from vertically integrated firms with “intranet” systems, the 
ability of more individuals to observe market and product data provides valuable information to 
decision makers at the farm, processor, and regulator levels to help them better organize 
processes and logistics in a coordinated but potentially decentralized way.  How do we expect 
firms and industries will change with regard to their organization as well as their organization of 
exchange?  We now discuss in more detail how such issues may affect each of the following: 
exchange mechanism choice, firm organization, and industrial structure.  We will also discuss 
potential theoretical and empirical approaches to obtaining answers to these questions. 
 
Exchange Mechanism Choice 
Economists as well as policy makers and market participants have often been concerned 
about the nature of the exchange mechanism.  As far back as Forker (1975), there have been 
issues raised about the potential for “real-time” electronic trading.  In addition to item 3 in the 
above list of cost reductions, traditional arguments in favor of non-Internet-based electronic 
markets have included: (1) lower costs due to the elimination of transportation to central 
markets, as well as reduced loss due to animal stress in transportation, and (2) increases in 
pricing efficiency and competition as the number of potential buyers and sellers increases.  





mechanisms: (1) the need for clearly defined grades and product descriptions, (2) the necessity of 
a critical market size/volume to support market infrastructure (i.e., market liquidity), and (3) the 
need for rules and enforcement mechanisms that assure standards on grading and financial 
accountability. Furthermore, even on the Internet, such market structures have other 
impediments: (1) the possibility that individuals will just bypass or not use such systems in order 
to avoid any user costs, and (2) the difficulty of communicating terms of trade on such things as 
delivery and quality.  Andrew McAfee (2000) remarks that peer-to-peer Internet networks (i.e., 
private networks and contracts) avoid fees and by definition allow for direct negotiation.   
Henderson (1982) indicates that while electronic marketing may lead to increased 
competition, improved market information, enhanced market access, and greater pricing 
accuracy and allocative efficiency, the questions of whether overall marketing and transaction 
costs are reduced remains open to question.  That is, bilateral/contract trading involves minimal 
travel by buyers and sellers (i.e., products are not shipped until the deal is complete), and the 
buyer and seller are known to one another and are able to deal with details such as product 
description and contracting rules relatively easily.  Henderson also argues that contracting in the 
exchange of agricultural produce has grown up very much because of its lower transactional 
costs.  
  Given the current status of trading various agricultural markets, we believe that there is 
little likelihood that the overall nature of trading relationships will change in terms of the relative 
usages of contracts and auctions in the near term.  However, we would like to discuss in greater 
detail how information technology and the cost reduction mentioned above might lead to a better 
outlook for auction markets and related exchange mechanisms in agricultural markets relative to 
contracts over the longer run.  Importantly, we believe that the degree to which an auction 
framework persists or how contracts are restructured in the Internet era depends very heavily on 
the product characteristics and industry structure of a product as follows: 
•  Are buyers concerned about the way a good is produced? 
•  What are the dimensions and measurability of quality differences? 
•  Are the goods perishable and what are the temporal dimensions of availability? 
•  What are the historical relationships in trading the commodity?  
- What is the industry structure (size and number of potential participants)?   





  For example, open input supply markets are very similar to other markets on the Internet 
where products are well defined and cataloged or posted prices work very efficiently.  However, 
few agricultural electronic markets have successfully created the market environment for the 
output side of farm production.  In that light, one direction of research is to look at those few 
ventures that have achieved some success and clearly answer the questions above.  One can then 
look at other commodities that are not currently widely traded via the Internet to arrive at 
differing product characteristics that may cause such differences in use.  Even before that, it 
would be worthwhile to go through the various important agricultural products traded into the 
United States in order to have an overall catalog of initial positions of commodity trade prior to 
the arrival of the Internet.  From there, researchers will be better able to arrive at broader 
theoretical and empirical generalities about the impact of Internet technologies on agricultural 
marketing. 
 
Auction Markets as Exchange Mechanisms for the Internet 
  As a general overview of the tensions, which drive adoption of different exchange 
mechanisms, we will now take heed of the general concerns discussed above with regard to the 
long-term viability of auction markets as part of the exchange portfolio of agents in a given 
commodity grouping.  This discussion provides a starting point from which researchers can then 
add the unique characteristics of the various agricultural industries. 
It is worth noting that the primary purpose of auctions has traditionally been to expedite 
sale/purchase of goods/services, obtain truthful revelations of the valuations of auction 
participants, and prevent dishonest negotiations among participants, which result from 
asymmetries in information and/or market power.  In that context, this section will provide a 
brief discussion of the theory of auctions, their relation to agriculture, and the growing discussion 
of optimal auctions for the Internet and for complex transactions.  For the sake of clarity, we 
consider auctions to be mechanisms by which participants bid to buy/sell goods/services or a 
combination of goods and services under preset rules specifying who will be the winner(s) of the 
process and how much they will pay for the goods/services.  Furthermore, as discussed earlier, 
auction rules may preclude some individuals/firms from participating, delineate the types of bids 
that may be made, and can specify how participants must behave (Wolfstetter, 1999).  While one 





history of auctions being used in agriculture, even if not as the dominant trading mechanism.  As 
recently as 1994, the volume of pork sold by auction or in terminal market arrangements was 
expected to be 1.2 percent of total volume in 1998 (USDA, 1996).   
The theoretical literature on auctions has grown rapidly since the early 1960’s and the 
theory has been applied widely to meet the needs of business and governments for a variety of 
purposes.  The foundations of the literature have been well-developed since that time; however, 
much of what relates to the concerns of agriculture remains to be developed more fully despite 
what appears to be the relative simplicity of trading agricultural commodities.  In particular, the 
literature on multi-unit objects and the bundling of heterogeneous objects (i.e., transportation 
services, financing, and the commodities) is still in its infancy and many issues remain to be 
worked out (Klemperer, 1999).   
Nevertheless, several theoretical papers have alluded to issues that may very well 
impinge on the development of effective auctions for agricultural commodities on the Internet.  
In particular, fees have often been considered as a revenue generator for Internet auction 
mechanisms.  However, recent work on double auction markets suggests that the addition of fees 
will not impede convergence to competitive equilibrium prices but will result in lower quantities 
of goods exchanged and consequently less market efficiency (Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux, 
1998).  Another paper by Jeitschko (1999) highlights the fact that if goods of a particular type are 
auctioned sequentially (e.g., in lots), price formation in such a market will depend on 
participants’ knowledge about the overall quantity that will be sold.  If buyers are unaware of 
how many lots will be sold after the first auction, the auction will yield declining prices in each 
of the subsequent auctions; however, if it is learned in the course of the sequential auctions, for 
example, that the ultimate supply falls short, then prices of subsequent lots may in fact increase. 
Also, Ausubel and Cramton (1998) discuss certain problems related to multi-unit auctions 
whereby strategic behavior by bidders (i.e., signaling low demand) can lead to allocative 
inefficiency.  In the context of designing appropriate auctions or exchange mechanisms for the 
Internet, the issue of when auctions occur, how often goods can be put up and or demanded, if 
transaction fees are to be charged, and how participants must reveal their supply and demand for 
products, becomes very important when one considers the potential strategic and market 





Another study by Lu and McAfee (1999) notes that auctions are superior to bargaining 
mechanisms, therefore, indicating that auctions can be the optimal trading mechanism under 
certain circumstances.  The circumstances in which the model is developed includes 
homogeneity of agents and where transaction costs are equivalent.  However, greater 
heterogeneity of agents, as is often the case among buyers and sellers in agriculture, tends to 
favor auctions because of their ability to allow for rapid search and match of buyers and sellers.  
That is, one would expect that greater heterogeneity of agents could strengthen this result. 
However, transaction costs of obtaining all of the other auxiliary services tend to favor 
bargaining or the creation of contracts in agriculture.  Furthermore, since such bargaining can be 
for a multiple-period set of transactions (i.e., an agreement to supply a product for t periods into 
the future) and thereby spread the relative inefficiencies of bargaining in search and matching, 
the theoretical basis for the superiority of auctions is not matched with reality.   
Once auctions overcome the disparity in transaction costs associated with obtaining 
auxiliary services, then the predictions of Lu and McAfee may prove to be true in the exchange 
of agricultural commodities.  We will discuss at greater length below how the informational and 
administrative cost reduction resulting from the Internet appear to overcome this “transaction 
cost” factor. 
While these theoretical works provide some intuition about what concerns arise in the 
implementation of auctions, work in other areas has presented ideas about the actual 
implementation of such trading mechanisms in both analog and digital forms.  Two approaches 
dealing separately with the seller’s side and the buyer’s side problems have been developed in 
the past two years.  Beam, Seque, and Shanthikumar (1999) have attempted to determine how 
sellers should optimally auction their goods (i.e., how much should be auctioned at any given 
time) based on the equilibrium price predicted by their model.  Specifically, their work presents a 
mathematical model (orbit queue) which, using some approximations and simplifying 
assumptions, provides a useful initial treatment of optimal auctions on the Internet by sellers.  
Unfortunately, their mechanism does not allow for producers, i.e., sellers to consider multiple 
outputs and/or services to be provided to a buyer or buyers.   
More recently, Gallien and Wein (2000) have looked at the buyer’s side of problem of 
Internet auctions by designing and analyzing smart markets for industrial procurement.  They 





implementation was poorly adapted to the selection of suppliers in procurement markets when 
there are capacity constraints, transportation costs, supplier switching costs, and quality 
requirements.  In accord with the earlier remarks by Henderson, Gallien and Wein indicate that 
the transfer price is but one dimension of the overall transaction.  With that in mind, they 
develop a model under the context of capacity constraints.
4  These authors propose the use of 
Smart Markets, which are exchange institutions supported by a computer executing an 
optimization algorithm to solve the allocation problem associated with each given set of bids.  
After making certain simplifying assumptions about the behavior of procurers, they implement 
there mechanism using a linear programming framework and attempt to relate how this model 
will provide a useful framework of an electronic trading system, which enables real-time 
complex industrial transactions.   
Notably for agriculture, Gallien and Wein (2000) remark that diseconomies of scope 
could make their framework inoperative since it is unable to capture the fact that a participant 
may not have adequate transportation or other logistical abilities needed to handle the complete 
transfer. On a practical level, Roddy (2000) argues that since many buyers and sellers in open 
market exchanges must conduct complementary transactions of goods and services such as 
transportation, storage and insurance after the trade itself is completed, the time and money spent 
on the subsequent arrangements often eliminates the value created by the electronic exchange in 
the first place.  That is, it may be necessary to involve other suppliers in the transaction and, 
therefore, a combinatorial auction may be more appropriate.  The idea of such auctions is not 
new relative to the age of the Internet.  Gross and Licking (1999) remark that software has 
become available that will “allow buyers and sellers to bundle their requirements into far more 
complex and flexible bundles.”  As alluded to earlier in this paper, economic efficiency may be 
enhanced if procurers are allowed to bid on combinations of different goods and services.  In 
seeking to benefit from such efficiency gains and as a consequence of growing computer power, 
many firms have begun to offer software to deal with such auctions (de Vries and Vohra, 2000).   
Because of the potential complexity of determining the winners of combinatorial 
auctions, only recently have researchers obtained determinations of winners in ways that are 
computationally manageable as well as being optimal in an economic sense, where previous 
                                                 
4 N.B. They do not deal with problems related to transportation costs or switching costs because of the sheer 





attempts did not guarantee optimality or were too computationally intensive (Sandholm, 2000). 
The work on automated agents will allow for the effective implementation as well as allowing 
for economic modeling and experimentation of this framework relative to others.  As early as 
1993, researchers developed models that would allow for optimization-based trading of 
commodities using “intelligent” automated agents (Lee and Lee, 1993).  More recently, 
Sandholm (1999) developed software that allows for the use of both artificial intelligence along 
with combinatorial auctions.  This paper does not seek to explain the actual computer 
implementation of such mechanisms, but suffice it to say that the technology is available to 
handle such complex transactions across multiple exchanges and the cost reductions discussed 
above come into play in this arena.  
  As to problems of market liquidity, if multiple exchanges exist for the same type of 
product, problems of inadequate market participation in any given market could arise.  Market 
participants are quite aware of this problem, however.  Jordan (2000) remarks that if a large 
number of exchanges and related markets are to coexist, mechanisms must allow for cross-listing 
on separate sites thereby increasing the liquidity of each of the sites. Appropriate payment 
methods across exchanges could ensure that revenues are shared equitably among market 
makers.  Similarly, as suggested by Wise and Morrison (2000), such exchanges will need to 
evolve into a cooperative structure such that exchanges will no longer serve as for-profit centers 
but will be have a public good quality to them such that they operate at cost.  Alternatively, 
different exchanges will merge.  As noted earlier, recent mergers and acquisitions in the Internet 
sector seem to indicate that this is the direction in which firms are moving.  Specifically, 
Rooster.com and Pradium.com, two pioneeers in the agricultural Internet exchange and 
information center area recently agreed to join forces in providing exchange services.  Similarly, 
Farms.com recently acquired Cybercrop.com to better attain adequate markets size and scope. 
  While the applications and use of auctions has had limited success, the Internet, coupled 
with the other information technologies, offers a new beginning for these mechanisms to allow 
for greater transparency and to potentially increase efficiency of pricing as well as eliminate 
some of the administrative costs associated with contracting and the dynamic costs associated 
with the inflexibility imposed by contracts.  In summarizing the issues discussed above and 





open exchange mechanisms can accomplish tasks necessary to maintain their current share of 
physical markets with some long run possibilities for growth. 
(1)  In accord with our listing of cost-reducing effects of the Internet, items 1, 2, and 3 
(pages 28 and 29) help to eliminate costs associated with allied services related to the 
commodity transfer, which some agents consider to be more significant than efficiency 
gains from improved competition provided in the arrival at the transfer price for the 
commodity.  That is, the technology can allow markets to overcome the same problems 
that contracts overcome.  In particular, technology is available to allow firms to easily 
procure transportation, storage, financing, and related logistical services with the same 
security and ease that private treaty contractual arrangements provide.   
(2)  Similarly, software and Internet technology allows for open exchange mechanisms to 
further reduce search and matching costs associated with finding suppliers with particular 
attributes and/or abilities.  In that vein, as noted in items 4 and 5 (page 29) of the 
information cost economizing list above, the technology allows for differentiation of 
commodities based on their attributes (e.g., extra-lean pork, natural pork, GMO, non-
GMO, etc.) as well as assist in the preservation of such products’ identities.  Since many 
processors have particular needs in this area, exchange mechanisms must allow for this 
degree of specificity.  Furthermore, if exchanges are to succeed they must perform this 
searching and matching in such a way that the costs of obtaining suppliers are less than 
when contracts are used.   
(3)  Exchanges must allow for the aggregation of the goods from several suppliers into a 
bundle for a particular procurer.  Given that item 3 (page 29) in our earlier information 
cost reducing list shows that this is possible, successful markets will incorporate this 
capability.  That is, buyers should not be restricted to depending on large producers to 
obtain their supplies.  Such a mechanism would permit greater competition among 
suppliers and open access to smaller producers.  Conversely, the system should allow for 
disaggregation so that several smaller processors could buy a subset of a large producers 
output. 
(4)  Unfortunately, the biggest problem that open exchanges and auctions still face is 
achieving market liquidity.  This is a problem of network externalities, which any such 





market; therefore, this could lead to under-participation and below top-level social 
benefits of such markets.  Furthermore, the problem of achieving market liquidity is also 
one of competing exchanges as noted earlier.  If multiple exchanges deal in a particular 
commodity and cross-listing by participants is costly, then the overall liquidity of any 
given exchange will be lower as some potential participants opt out of some of the 
markets (i.e., participants will concentrate in only one subset of the possible exchanges 
available to them).  Only through cooperation, mergers, and/or market exit by market 
intermediaries will this be overcome.  As noted, there has been some indication that exit 
and mergers have been the method, which firms are adopting. 
 
  In closing this section on auction markets, we note that rules and regulations of the 
market mechanism can be as important as the auction format chosen.  Poorly defined and loosely 
enforced rules will certainly lead to market failure.  Market clearing and settlement rules are 
critical to ensure that payment is made and received and that products are delivered and received 
in appropriate time spans and conditions.  Furthermore, as noted in the theoretical discussion 
above, time is a critical dimension. When will the auctions occur and what will their durations 
be?  Auction time must be convenient, but with the Internet 24 hours a day and 365 days a year 
are available, there are a multitude of timing dimensions.  The key point of timing is to help 
ensure enough volume or liquidity in the market, and setting a convenient time enhances that 
possibility.  As to duration, we note that urgency (i.e., shorter auctions) helps stimulate liquidity, 
but at the same time it can limit entrants into the market.  Whether to have anonymous bidding or 
open exposure rules is also important.  Open exposure is important because it can enforce truth 
telling and avoid shill bidding.  However, anonymity can be important where the entrance of 
known individuals or firms can influence the market.  This is particularly the case when there are 
highly concentrated markets.  For example, Cargill can influence behavior of market participants 
through its actions in a market; therefore, open exposure rules may pose problems for such 
markets.  As alluded to above with regard to shill bidding, the Internet poses particular issues 
because of its open architecture and difficulty in enforceability.  Recently, eBay uncovered cases 
of shill bidding in their auctions for rare paintings and rapidly moved to prosecute to ensure the 
integrity of their auctions.  Similar procedures must be developed for electronic agricultural 





with no intention of buying a product entering the market on behalf of the seller to move the 
price up), collusion (side agreements to force prices upward), and misrepresentation of products.   
Failure to act swiftly and forcefully will undermine trust in participants and degenerate the 
market.   
 
The Implications of the Internet on Contracting and Vertical Integration 
  Above we have discussed how the Internet could be implemented to improve the 
efficiency of auction mechanisms irrespective of the commodity type.  Now, we discuss at 
greater length than we have elsewhere, how contracting is similarly improved as well as address 
the question of how these improvements will affect the tradeoff between auctions, contracts, and 
vertical integration as coordination mechanisms.  Such clarification will highlight and provide 
support for our belief that while there will be improved efficiency in the overall exchange of 
products, it is unclear whether firms will switch from one mechanism to another in the short run.  
In one specific example, e-Markets.com provides services in linking and supporting negotiations 
among potential contracting parties.  Agmotion.com provides a similar service in linking 
suppliers to buyers.  These services help to reduce the search and administrative costs (i.e., paper 
work) of contracting.  In general, for the same cost reduction reasons that auctions are made 
efficient, contracts are also improved; however, for long-term arrangements where contracts are 
important, the Internet may allow auctions for contracts.   
  Open exchanges have certainly been a hot topic in the discussion of business-to-business 
e-commerce, however, to date they have had limited success.  That may be because unlike 
consumers who are typically buying a very small volume of any particular item, agri-food supply 
chain participants make frequent and large scale purchases of a myriad of agricultural and food 
inputs and outputs.  In addition to the question of price, the primary issue of concern is sourcing 
desired products and in particularly maintaining operationally efficient levels of capacity in the 
distribution, handling, processing and manufacturing stages of the chain.  This can be a 
significant challenge in agriculture given production uncertainty.   
  However, with increasing clarification of contracting protocols, one can imagine firms 
participating in the contracting analogs of posted-price, bargaining, and auctions for contracts.  
For example, a “posted-price” contract on the Internet by Hormel would essentially be a listing 





would then be given contracts.  Alternatively, Hormel could state the contract provisions and 
have producers bid to be the suppliers.  Given the question of complementarities; however, 
mechanisms allowing for combined negotiations for a variety of services might be even more 
useful.  Market participants may be able to enjoy more transparent price discovery and efficient 
allocation with the reduced long-term administrative costs and assured supplies of contracts.  
One caveat should be inserted, however.  That is, given the relatively small number of buyers in 
many agricultural markets, we could observe tacit collusion through price signaling in contracts, 
but this same caveat will hold under a mandatory price reporting regime as well.  Furthermore, if 
there is a sufficiently large competitive fringe in the processing/buying side of the industry, such 
a problem is mitigated. 
  The next question with regard to the impacts of the Internet and information technology 
on vertical relationships is whether monitoring cost reduction provide for reduced incentives to 
have a small network of approved buyers/suppliers as opposed to having open access.  One 
would suspect that improved monitoring would make it easier for firms to negotiate contracts at 
arms length; however, there may be attributes of some agricultural industries that require the 
confidence and trust built into approved buyer/suppler networks.   
  Beyond the question of how contracts will perform relative to auctions and whether 
contracts will be auctioned, how do the cost reductions of Internet information technologies 
affect the decision to engage in vertical integration?  This question is central and goes back to 
Coase (1937) in which he argues that a firm will grow (i.e., in this case, vertical integration will 
take place) up to the point where the costs of an extra transaction within the firm is equal to the 
cost of carrying out the same transaction by means of exchange in the open market.  Transactions 
costs include issues of search costs for best suppliers, monitoring costs of production methods, 
and the more mundane issues of logistics and scheduling when there are significant adjacent firm 
size discrepancies.  Consequently, the search, match, and aggregation capabilities of the Internet 
would be relevant to this decision (i.e., reducing the need for integration); however, in a 
Williamsonian world, other issues are relevant as well.  That is, Williamson (1975) argues that if 
individuals are boundedly rational and at least some agents are given to opportunism, contractual 
incompleteness introduces potential costs to contracts when there is uncertainty about the future 
and if there is some degree of asset specificity involved.  In such a case, it is possible for one 





party has made investments in assets that reduce outside opportunities.  Similar arguments have 
been made in the agricultural context with regard to poultry and swine production contracts.   
  While we could argue that the increased capacity for real-time visual and written 
monitoring of the behavior of contracting parties as well as quicker communication methods 
helps to mitigate such possibilities of hold-up and, therefore, improve the possibility for 
contracting in agriculture, Grossman and Hart (1986) have warned that the link between lower 
cost contracting and increased reliance on market-mediated transaction may not hold.  Optimal 
asset ownership is also determined by who most efficiently will hold the residual rights of 
control.  An implication of their theory is that any change in contractibility will induce a new set 
of non-contractible decision rights, which in turn will force reevaluation of who should best hold 
residual rights of control.  How contractibility affects asset ownership and the boundaries of the 
firm thus depends on the details of what becomes contractible and what remains in the set of 
residual rights (Baker and Hubbard, 1999).  Of course, in practice these issues are intertwined to 
form a complex incentive structure for disintermediating the price discovery mechanism of the 
market in favor of simply managing product transfers between stages of production.  In that 
light, a frequently cited incentive for integration has been that the demand to manage product 
flows and quality may outweigh concerns about pricing products in the market.  The Internet’s 
capabilities to improve logistic and production information management systems and, therefore, 
improve management and efficiency of integrated production systems is a factor favoring 
integration.   
  Importantly, integration is not a panacea for concerns about direction and residual rights 
of control and decision making over production.  Without market signals, integrated firms face 
the challenge of efficiently allocating production resources, capital and revenues.  With ongoing 
technical change, such institutional rigidity can create distortions in integrated production 
systems relative to the allocation an efficient market would provide.  Furthermore, whereas 
historical information exchange systems for EDI (electronic data interchange) such as VANs 
(value added networks) required significant specific investments in both hardware and software 
coding and were largely proprietary and limited competition (Kekre and Mudhopadhyay, 1992), 
the Internet provides a common and open architecture where regardless of location or time, 
multiple users with a personal computer and a browser can access applications at the same time.  





will arise in electronic commerce.  With Internet-based electronic commerce still in its infancy, it 
is nearly impossible to predict the outcome, but it surely will introduce a new dynamic to the 
nature of agricultural firms.   
As an extension of this argument over the relative strengths of the various market 
exchange mechanisms and the implications of the Internet, we would like to treat traceability, 
identity preservation, and production differentiation as a separate issue.  The agri-food sector has 
handled this traceability problem to date by forging very tight vertically contracted or integrated 
business structures.  Essentially, firms have managed supply chain integrity by fiat.  For 
example, Smithfield’s Lean Generation pork products are derived from their NPD line of swine 
genetics.  This brand also carries the Heart Healthy seal of the American Heart Association.  
Smithfield can make these claims because they have an integrated production chain, which 
allows segmentation and identification of those specific pork products.  It is much more difficult 
for an individual producer to maintain this identity through the production chain as the genetic 
attributes are not observable and measurement or sampling and segmentation by animal is 
expensive.  As alluded to earlier, electronic identification (bar codes, radio frequency ID’s, 
embedded chips) offer the potential for cost effectively obtaining attribute data and seamlessly 
passing it to subsequent segments of the supply chain.  The Internet is the cost effective medium 
for this information transfer.  This may enable individual producers to more effectively “brand” 
themselves to downstream supply chain partners and enhance smaller scale traceability. 
Consequently, there will be less need for tight integration in maintaining identity within the firm 
thereby mitigating the traditional incentives for integration in this case.  Theoretically, such open 
mechanisms could also lead to more product innovation at the farm level.  Ultimately, by 
improving traceability through open mechanisms and reducing the need for integration, there 
may be increased efficiency of asset allocation and management by integrators as well.  That is, 
vertical integrators will no longer need to dilute their capital through capital investments in 
multiple supply chain segments.  This comment leads to what we believe to be the central 
economic structure question of e-commerce in agriculture:  Can e-commerce in combination 







Regulatory Issues and The Role of Government 
 
  To this point, the Internet has resembled a free-for-all competition among businesses 
attempting to market themselves as market intermediaries and contractual facilitators.  
Nevertheless, there is a rising need for regulation to influence the future development of the 
Internet.  Three regulatory issues are as old as markets themselves: market fairness, taxation 
issues, and intellectual property regulations.  A new issue, which will also affect agriculture, is 
privacy.   Most of the physical world issues of market function are similar: providing accurate 
weights and measures, representation of product, and delivery requirements are all handled under 
existing common contract law or other commerce laws.  As noted earlier, eBay is currently 
embroiled in the issue of shill bidding in their auction markets, including markets for rare coins.  
While eBay stands to lose a great deal in terms of reputation and credibility, there are no external 
regulations on the conduct of their auctions.  Given similar potential problems for electronic 
agricultural commerce, there is no agency that regulates electronic trading of physical assets.  
While the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has rules governing all futures contracts 
whether electronically or physically traded, no regulations deal with the type of electronic spot 
markets and contractual facilitators, which have grown up over the past three years.   Effective 
regulation of these markets will have important implications for ensuring fair and valid 
exchanges in agricultural commodity markets.  
  The privacy issue is also potentially problematic.  Digital information is easily storable 
and the computer technology that collects it also allows for sophisticated analysis.  The most 
valuable use of this information is in tracking purchasing habits or sales habits of suppliers.   The 
utilization of historical purchasing patterns is known as “push” marketing.  Input suppliers may 
be able to monitor the buying habits of producers and thereby use sophisticated marketing 
techniques to direct their future buying patterns.  For example, a producer who purchases 
herbicide resistant crop varieties will likely be pushed towards herbicide suppliers with 
compatible products.  Although this can be helpful in assisting producers in bundling appropriate 
technologies, a producer must be cognizant of who receives what information and how it will be 
used.  Alternatively, if there are open exposure rules, buyers can more easily monitor the historic 
behavior of suppliers and act strategically in markets or contracts to obtain rents from the 





  We mentioned earlier in this paper that there are consortia of existing agribusiness firms 
that have joined to create e-commerce platforms.  In the case of livestock, owners of one e-
commerce platform control approximately 70-80% of the total meat processing capacity in the 
United States.  The obvious concern raised is one of collusion and price-fixing.  Given that 
electronic information can be shared very efficiently, it would be quite easy for them to simply 
link buying protocols and begin to manipulate markets.  Years of investigation of pricing 
practices in the livestock and packing industry have mostly been fruitless due to a lack of 
documented pricing practices.  As such, while electronic markets present challenges to regulators 
as noted above, the digitization of this process leaves an electronic trail, which could actually 
provide an excellent vehicle for monitoring transactions and verifying trading practices.  Up to 
this time, regulatory agencies such as the Grain Inspection and Packers and Stockyards 
Association and the Justice Department have been slow to move on how to address the new 
world of e-commerce and competition.   
 
Summary, Conclusions, and Suggestions for Research Priorities 
 
  The theoretical and real-world concerns we have voiced in this paper beg the question of 
how the Internet and information technology can and will be exploited.  Throughout the paper, 
the idea has surfaced that electronic-commerce and exchanges may have profound effects on the 
organization and structure of agriculture.  These structural impacts will be both direct and 
indirect.  The direct structural impacts will be created by who develops agricultural e-commerce 
applications.  The indirect impacts will be from how the use of the Internet begins to alter market 
dynamics and firm behavior as information and communications improve. 
  As suggested above, various business models have been used in the last few years to 
develop business-to-business exchange mechanisms for the Internet.  The early mechanisms 
were extremely simple auction or posted-price mechanisms; however, these mechanisms were 
far too crude to meet the needs of an increasingly complex agri-food sector, which demand 
traceability of goods, efficient transactional modes, and adequate market liquidity.  While 
electronic commerce is currently undergoing some growing pains, it will become a ubiquitous 
fact of trade in coming years.  To the extent electronic commerce mediates transactions costs and 





integration and vertical contractual coordination.  For open electronic agricultural markets to 
survive they must achieve adequate liquidity and provide sufficient utility to participants by: (1) 
cooperating among themselves to allow for cross-listing/bidding or by merging, and (2) provide 
mechanisms that allow for a variety of transactions from simple to complex within some form of 
auction or exchange framework.  The first of these will provide adequate market size to allow 
such auctions to effectively match buyers and sellers, and the second of these will allow buyers 
and/or sellers to obtain a complex bundle of goods and services very rapidly and thereby 
eliminate the transaction efficiency advantage of traditional contracting approaches.   
  The corollary to the efficiency improvements for open exchange mechanisms is that to 
the extent e-commerce improves management information systems and logistics control, it may 
also improve the efficiency of integrated systems.  If integrated firms, firms using contracts and 
private networks are to persist, they must leverage their current transaction economies on the 
Internet and thereby trump the efficiency gains of open exchanges.  Given the potentially greater 
profit motive for participating firms and intermediaries in private arrangements, many companies 
have and are investing in private network building. 
  In the end, we have illustrated the competitive benchmark for electronic market systems 
— they must offer at least the benefits of vertical integration and contracting or they will not 
supplant or even exist in parallel with such mechanisms.  Electronic logistics may offer 
possibilities for independent producers as well.  In particular, electronic traceability can spread 
benefits of branding and consumer access to smaller operations, which had previously been 
unable to maintain identity or obtain access.  The outcomes of the broader e-commerce structural 
impacts will rest directly on how effectively electronic logistics platforms are developed and if 
efficient electronic exchange mechanisms are developed.  Otherwise, Internet-based e-commerce 
is as likely to narrow agricultural supply chains as to expand their scope.  The only certainty is 
that electronic commerce will alter the nature of firm interaction.  Individual producers must be 
aware of the potential strategic implications if they are to take maximum advantage of this new 
technology.  What will be the nature of the agricultural firm and market in the age of the 
Internet? 
  In answering this broad question, researchers and policy makers must break it down into 
a number of smaller but still extremely complex tasks and questions.  In closing this work, we 





electronic commerce on agricultural firms and industrial structure.  Using our current knowledge, 
we must arrive at clear definitions of product differences and dimensions in agriculture.  
Furthermore, we must catalog from studies already performed the different industrial structures 
across commodities and products in agriculture.  Efforts must be made to incorporate the 
literature on technology adoption in agriculture as well as that on information technology 
adoption in other industries/sectors to derive a conceptual and empirical framework for the 
adoption of Internet technology in agriculture.  While this issue is related to others, gaining 
insights into this area will help us to understand better the rate at which the Internet’s 
mechanisms will affect relations within agricultural industries. 
  As discussed, there are several important issues with regard to the development of 
Internet intermediaries.  Particularly, researchers need to develop a conceptual model describing 
the qualities of business models of Internet intermediaries that survive.  As an initial approach, 
researchers should investigate currently successful firms as a basis for this research, and then 
attempt to model how successful firms will operate and in which industries they will work.  
Important questions are the following.  What factors determine the methods by which firms 
overcome problems of network externalities among competing exchanges?  What industrial 
specific factors affect this choice?  In this same context, we should investigate theories that will 
help us to explain ownership of intermediaries (i.e., which parties have the greatest incentives to 
own “intermediaries,” producers, processors, third parties?).  Importantly, how will ownership 
affect the portfolio of exchange mechanisms and services provided by different types of 
intermediaries?  We can use information on different products and their industrial structures to 
attempt to catalog how different products may give rise to different intermediary structures. 
  Another question, which is quite relevant given the current status of Internet commerce in 
agriculture, is what type of auction markets would be preferred (aside from the question of 
whether any would be preferred at all).  That is, if we believe that auction markets will not 
dominate but will still play a role in helping firms to sell surplus production or make capacity 
goals for processing, we should develop theory explaining auction mechanism choice when only 
small proportion of inputs are derived from processors through auctions.  Which participants 
gain and lose from different mechanisms in a direct sense?  How does the commodity specific 
industry structure affect this choice? How might this price discovery process affect the structure 





  Perhaps one of the most complex problems we have discussed is competition among 
exchange mechanisms (i.e., between auctions, contracts, and vertical integration).  Will the 
search, match, aggregation, and monitoring cost reduction reduce contracting relative to auction 
markets over the long run and in what type of industries?  Will there be auction bidding for 
contracts as networks or as open mechanisms?  Similarly, will monitoring cost reduction and 
related traceability capabilities of the Internet increase or reduce vertical integration? 
  While not discussed at length in the paper, we must also consider how Internet 
technology will affect horizontal relationships within agricultural industries.  What aspects of 
those industries when interacted with the cost reducing capacities of the Internet will lead to 
more horizontal integration in the processor and or producer levels?  For example, regardless of 
regulatory impediments, does the ability to share and manage information increase the incentive 
of North Carolina integrated firms to buy out Midwestern processors? 
  The Internet and associated information technologies will affect businesses and industries 
throughout agriculture.  In the context of agricultural economics, as we better understand how 
information technology affects agricultural markets, we will be able to contribute clearer 
suggestions and proposals to businesses and government with regard to development and 
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